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Based on a detailed calculation of the recapitalisation requirements of the Greek banks, we find that the 
sector needs an infusion of capital, but that the level largely depends on the stringency of the capital 
requirements applied. An expedient quick fix to comply with the minimum capital requirements could 
be achieved by a bail-in of existing creditors under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of 
around €5 billion, leaving only €6 billion needed for re-capitalisation. If the ‘Cypriot’ standard is 
applied, however, the required re-capitalisation would be €15 billion. A ‘generous’ approach, which takes 
into account the phasing in of the new more-stringent capital requirements until 2018, would imply a 
re-capitalisation of €29 billion (or more bailing-in of creditors). The re-capitalisation should be 
undertaken preferably by the EIB, the EBRD or the new Greek investment fund, rather than via loans 
from the ESM to the Greek government.  
he political uncertainty and the concomitant deterioration of the real economy have put 
into reverse the recovery of Greece’s banking system, which started in 2014 when the 
sector attracted €8 billion in private funds. But the mix of weakening economic 
performance, uncertainty about the sustainability of Greek government debt and its future in 
the euro area led to renewed deposit flight since late last year. These developments and the 
strengthening of the collateral requirements by the ECB forced Greek banks to re-apply for 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). Since the beginning of the year, the ELA provided by 
the Bank of Greece with approval of the European Central Bank (ECB) surged to around €87 
billion in June, or over one-fifth of the total balance sheet. With the announcement of the 
referendum, the ECB decided to limit the amount of ELA the Greek banks could use and the 
Greek government was forced to introduce capital controls and limits on bank withdrawals.  
The controls can only be lifted if the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) can certify to the 
ECB that the Greek banks are solvent. But this might be a problem, given the rapid 
deterioration of their capital position. The 2014 stress test already showed that the Greek banks 
were vulnerable, barely passing the threshold after recapitalisation and assuming future 
deleveraging. However, the economy is now doing worse than even the most pessimistic 
adverse scenario envisaged last year. It is thus likely that the capital ratios are falling below 
the regulatory minima.  
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The latest figures publically available on the regulatory capital position of the individual Greek 
banks are from end-2014. In order to assess their capital needs today, we must therefore use 
estimations to assess the magnitude and impact of the economic deterioration. The estimations 
shown in Table 1 are based on the Greek credit institutions’ monthly aggregated balance sheet 
for June 2015, the 2014 annual reports of the four large banks and the 2014 stress test results. 
Table 1. Estimated capital shortfall of Greek banks (€ bn) 
Indicators Amounts 
Capital and reserves 69 
Provisions for bad loans (June 2015) (41) 
Total equity 28 
Regulatory capital adjustment (Basel 2.5) (3) 
Regulatory capital adjustment (Basel 3 – 2014) (3) 
Minimum total regulatory capital  
(assuming 8% of RWA) 
(18) 
Capital buffer/(shortfall) based on end of 2014 capital definition 4 
  
Estimated increase in bad loans (+15%)  (15) 
Capital buffer/(shortfall) as of July/August (11) 
  
Additional capital required o increase capital ratio to 12% (of RWA) (9) 
Capital buffer/(shortfall) based on 2014 capital definition (12% of RWA) (20) 
  
Regulatory capital adjustment (CRR/CRD IV – needed fully only in 2018) (14) 
Capital buffer/(shortfall) based on fully loaded capital definition (12% of RWA)  (34) 
Sources: Authors’ estimations based on data from the 2014 annual reports of four largest banks, Bank of Greece and 
European Banking Authority. 
Until recently, Greek banks still had capital in excess of the minimum required: €69 billion in 
capital and reserves were partially offset by €41 billion of provisions for bad loans, leaving 
around €28 billion in equity. But about €6 billion needs to subtracted from this figure for items 
that are not eligible as regulatory capital.1 Thus, based on the capital definition as of the end 
of 2014, the Greek banks had as recently as June approximately €4 billion in excess of the €18 
billion aggregate total minimum capital requirement of 8% of ‘risk -weighted assets’.2  
‘Quick-fix’-recapitalisation 
These calculations explain why until recently the SSM could consider the Greek banks solvent. 
But the deterioration of the economy is worsening the capital position. Non-performing loans 
will surely increase, leading experts to foresee an increase of around 10 to 15 percentage points 
on top of the current 40%.3 A quick back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that this would 
                                                     
1 The capital items and assets that need to be deducted from the regulatory capital have been expanded 
under the new capital requirements legislation (CRDIV/CRR), which is gradually being phased-in (one-
fifth every year). 
2 The Greek banks’ risk-weighted assets were equal to 58% of total assets at the end of 2014. 
3 Calculated as the ratio of non-performing to total loans already in the books. 
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imply losses of €15 billion.4 Total regulatory capital would then fall €11 billion below the 
minimum requirement.    
‘Standard’-recapitalisation 
The Cypriot banks that faced similar problems in 2012-13 were required to reach capital ratios 
of at least 12% of risk-weighted assets. To reach this 4 percentage points higher level, the Greek 
banks would need €9 billion additional capital, bringing the shortfall to €20 billion.  
‘Generous’ recapitalisation 
But the supervisor might ask the banks to anticipate the phasing-in of the new capital 
requirements, which are fully applicable only from 2018 onward. Although the capital is not 
required yet, the three-year duration of the new ESM programme and uncertainty about the 
profitability in the upcoming years might prompt the Supervisor to ask the banks to comply 
already with the fully-loaded capital ratios now. Taking into account the additional €14 billion 
that is needed to comply with the CRDIV/CRR, the total shortfall would thus be around €34 
billion.  
At the present time, the Greek government barely has any funds available, which suggests that 
the Greek banks might have to be re-capitalised directly by the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). The statement issued by the Euro Summit of 12 July 2015 already mentioned that the 
new ESM programme will include €10-25 billion to cover the recapitalisation and resolution 
costs of the Greek banking sector. Our calculations show a similar range. 
Table 2. Mandatory bail-in of Greek banks (€ bn) 
Indicators Amounts 
Total liabilities and own funds 339 
Bail-in amount (8%) 27 
Own funds 22 
Bail-in of other creditors 5 
‘Pari-passu’ creditors  
Debt securities issued 2 
Other liabilities (incl. employee or trade credits that are exempted) 15 
Other non-eligible deposits 22 
Total ‘pari-passu’ creditors 39 
Estimated haircut 13% 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the Bank of Greece. 
The ESM prescribes that the creditors of the banks should first be bailed-in before the fund can 
put in capital. The fast-tracking of the transposition of the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) into national law, 5 which is one of the conditions before the negotiations on 
a new ESM programme can start, should contribute to an orderly bail-in. The bail-in should 
be 8% of total liabilities plus own funds – or about €27 billion for the Greek banks.  
                                                     
4 Loans to non-financial corporations accounted for around €220 billion in June 2015. Assuming a 15 
percentage point increase, the non-performing loans would increase up to €33 billion. Applying the 45% 
average expected loss rate from the 2014 stress test, the Greek banks are likely to face €15 billion in 
additional loan losses. 
5 The BRRD was transposed into Greek legislation on 22 July 2015. 
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However, and this is critical, there are own funds (including shares and subordinated bonds) 
equal to about €22 billion. These could be written off entirely. But since these instruments were 
already part of the own funds, writing them down does not generate the new own funds 
necessary to cover the shortfall.   
New own funds could be obtained if the creditors with a pari-passu claim are bailed-in. Table 
2 shows that there are about €39 billion of ‘bail-inable’ other liabilities.6 Even if not all of these 
creditors can be bailed-in, it should be possible to obtain €5 billion in bail-in, or somewhat 
more than 13% of the total of this class of creditors.  
If this is done, Greek banks would still need to generate between €6 and €29 billion in capital, 
depending on whether the supervisor demands a quick-fix [€6 billion], standard-
recapitalisation [€15 billion] or generous recapitalisation [€29 billion]. It is envisaged that the 
ESM will be endowed with between €10 and €25 billion for re-capitalisation of banks under a 
new programme, which is sufficient to allow banks to comply with the fully-loaded capital 
requirements, given that the funds need to be accompanied by a contribution of the domestic 
government. The 10% to 20% of the total public contribution that the government needs to 
contribute in case of an ESM direct recapitalisation might be generated from the privatisation 
process. But it might be preferable to find the capital entirely within institutions whose 
purpose is to invest in and manage risky assets. Possible candidates might be the European 
Investment (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) or through 
the €50 billion Greek privatisation fund that is currently under development, as we argued in 
an earlier paper.7 
                                                     
6 Secured liabilities are protected against the bail-in through collateral, while other liabilities are 
exempted or have received a preferential ranking in BRRD. The covered deposits and liabilities for 
payment and settlement are, for example, protected and the deposits of natural persons and small- and 
medium-sized enterprises have received a preferential status. The remaining creditors consist primarily 
of holders of debt securities, remaining liabilities and the deposits that are not eligible for the deposit 
guarantee scheme (DGS). 
7 See “Restructuring the Greek banking sector with an empty purse”, 13 July 2015 
(www.ceps.eu/publications/restructuring-greek-banking-sector-empty-purse). 
